[Dear Schmooze participants,
This is a condensed version of a longer piece that I’m currently working on. The longer piece is
intended for an audience of political theorists and political scientists, and as such discusses the
legal doctrine of campaign finance in much more extensive detail than is necessary for a legal
audience. I thus hope that you will excuse the superfluity in some of what follows. I eagerly look
forward to meeting all of you this weekend, and equally eagerly anticipate your thoughts and
comments.
Best,
Prithvi]
Why Campaign Finance Matters
Prithviraj Datta
Due to the combination of a host of factors – not least among them being the Supreme
Court decision in the case of Citizens United v FEC, the not-entirely-unrelated explosion of
Super PACs as a political force in electoral politics, and the tremendous increase in the amounts
that candidates and parties have been spending in their campaign efforts – the issue of campaign
finance has, once again, rise to prominence in scholarly and public debate. Unsurprisingly, given
the highly polarized and divisive political environment in which we live, the debate over
campaign finance is characterized by a sharp cleavage of opinion regarding the normative
desirability of the legal regime that governs campaign spending in the United States currently.
Yet, in spite of this renewal of interest, the debate is shaped almost entirely by two conceptions
of the normative significance of campaign finance which are themselves quite old, having been
developed in the course of prior eruptions of concern over the manner in which American
campaigns were funded and run. In the course of the account which follows, I will endeavor to
demonstrate that these conceptions of the salience of campaign spending – which I term the
“informational” and the “influence-based” conceptions respectively – suffer from serious
empirical and conceptual infirmities. To the extent that participants in the debate over the
desirability of the current campaign spending regime rely on these conceptions, therefore, the
arguments that they put forth rest on an unsound and unstable footing. A more empirically valid
and conceptually nuanced discussion of the merits of the contemporary campaign finance regime
is possible, however, if one regards campaign finance as being important not by virtue of the role
it plays in informing citizens, or enabling them to exercise greater political influence, but rather,
for the manner in which it permits those who engage in it to obtain affirmation for their political
preferences. The primary aim of this account, therefore, is to provide an outline of this
affirmational case for the democratic importance of campaign finance. Before commencing with
the provision of this outline, however, it is first necessary to take up the informational conception
of campaign finance for critique and analysis.
The Informational Conception of Campaign Finance
The most succinct – and perhaps best known – articulation of the informational
conception may be in found in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the United States
Supreme Court in the decision of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission. Citizens
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United involved a challenge to the constitutionality of restrictions on the broadcast of
“electioneering communications” funded by corporations or labor unions in the run-up to a
primary, or general election, for federal office. An “electioneering communication,” as defined
by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, referred to any broadcast communication
which was made 30 days before a contested primary or 60 days prior to a federal election,
referred to a candidate by name, and was targeted at the public. Citizens United was a non-profit
corporation which sought to broadcast a feature critical of Hillary Clinton, then a candidate for
the Democratic Presidential nomination, within the 30-day window prior to the first Democratic
primaries for the 2008 election. As such, the broadcast fell squarely within BCRA’s restriction
on electioneering communications. Aggrieved by the possibility of sanction for broadcasting the
documentary it produced, Citizens United moved the courts for relief, arguing, among other
grounds, that BCRA’s restrictions on electioneering communications violated its constitutional
right to the freedom of speech. In its final decision, following an unusual second round of
arguments, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court agreed with Citizens United. In his opinion
for the majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the restrictions were problematic because they
deprived
“the electorate…of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function. By suppressing the
speech of manifold corporations, both profit and non-profit, the Government prevents their
voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons and
entities are hostile to their interests.”1
Since the protection of the “the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among
candidates for office” was one of the foremost tasks of the United States Constitution’s
protection for the freedom of speech, Kennedy further concluded, these restrictions were also
unconstitutional, as were any forms of campaign finance limitations other than those aimed at
overcoming quid pro quo corruption, and enhancing the disclosure of the identities of those
engaged in campaign spending.2
Justice Kennedy’s treatment of campaign finance follows in a long line of judicial
decisions which treat such spending as a form of speech, and which regard the electoral sphere as
a “marketplace of ideas” entitled to heightened protection from governmental regulation.3 On
this view, campaign spending, in the first instance, enables individuals to engage in the
dissemination of their beliefs to the public at large at a period when the public’s attention to
issues of political significance is at its highest. Campaign spending, in this regard, enables
individuals to engage in the process of persuading their fellow citizens of the merits of the
positions, candidates, and parties whom they support. The importance of such efforts aimed at
persuasion, however, emerges from the impact that they have upon those who are exposed to
them, rather than from the benefits which accrue to those engaging in them. Where the members
of the public are confronted by a diversity of political arguments, each urging them to take a
different course of action on the day of the elections, this account further proceeds, they are
encouraged to reflect upon the competing arguments before them, and to follow the one which
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they find most convincing on its merits. The true democratic value of campaign finance, it thus
follows, emerges from the manner in which it enables citizens to engage in the reasoned
evaluation of the candidates and parties before them, thereby enhancing the quality of their
electoral decisions, and, by implication, of their government as well.4
There are thus two assumptions which underpin the informational conception of the
importance of campaign finance. The first is that campaigns matter; that is to say, that citizens
pay attention to the views and positions to which they are exposed in the period immediately
preceding elections, and that campaign messages play a role in the electoral decisions that they
make. Secondly, it must also be the case, as a matter of fact, that campaign spending prompts
reasoned evaluation for the informational conception to be an accurate description of the
importance of campaigns. The veracity of the informational conception hinges, in other words,
on its being true that the electoral messages that campaign spending funds either be intended as a
means of encouraging those exposed to it to engage in scrutinizing the positions of the
candidates and parties running for office on matters of collective political importance and relying
upon the results of their investigations to make their voting decisions, or that it have the effect of
doing so. Regrettably, however, all that we know about the realities of the modern American
electoral campaign indicates that there is very little warrant for believing that these assumptions
are true.
There are two sets of findings, in this regard, which are pertinent to highlight. Thus, in
the first instance, several political scientists have argued that voters largely decide whom to vote
for on the basis of pre-determined partisan affiliations, and that the information that they receive
during campaigns which run counter to these affiliations are often ignored.5 Furthermore, while a
large – and increasing – number of citizens declare themselves to be “independent,” and eschew
formal affiliation with any particular political party, partisan affiliations have been found to
dictate the voting behavior of a majority of these formally unattached citizens as well. 6 If these
accounts are correct, we have good reason to believe that campaigns play a role in determining
the political views of a very small minority of citizens. Secondly, and more prominently, there is
an overwhelming amount of evidence that political scientists have adduced to support their
contention that fundamental issues over which campaigns have little to no control, and indeed
which are often determined prior to the process of campaigning, play perhaps the most decisive
role in determining electoral outcomes.7 Thus, political scientists who study American politics
have had a considerable degree of success in predicting electoral outcomes well before the
campaign process gets fully underway, chiefly by focusing on public perceptions of the health of
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the economy, and the state of the nation’s security. 8 Taken cumulatively, therefore, these sets of
findings have led many political scientists to assert that electoral campaigns have limited effects
on determining political outcomes, and usually play only a small role in transforming the
political views that citizens hold. If this account is correct, it thus follows, efforts to defend
campaigns for the role that they play in informing citizens and enabling them to better identify
their political interests have no foundations in political reality.
The “minimal effects” school of thought has, it is important to concede, come in for
serious challenge in recent times, with several political scientists arguing that campaigns do, in
fact, have an impact on the decisions that voters make during elections. There is little in the
findings of these revisionist accounts, however, which supports Kennedy’s endorsement of
campaign finance as a means by which citizens may be prompted to reason about their political
interests, and help them attain a “consensus” on political issues as a result. Rather, to the extent
that campaigns do appear to have an effect on individuals, their impact may be attributed to the
prompting of spontaneous and irrational responses from those who are exposed to them. Thus,
while proponents of the “campaign effects” approach have found that exposure to campaigns,
and their messaging, can prompt citizens to change their minds, these persuasive effects are
usually felt by a small section of voters – those “persuadable partisans” who have traditionally
voted for a particular party or platform, and since become dissatisfied with them. For these
citizens, therefore, campaigns only provide the final push that convinces them to change their
vote, and do not themselves occasion the sort of deep reflection that precedes a switch in partisan
political affiliation.9 Furthermore, the role that campaigns play in persuading voters to change
their minds largely occurs through the priming of affective and emotional responses from these
citizens. When exposure to campaign messaging convinces voters, in other words, to change
their voting behavior, they do so not by prompting a reasoned re-evaluation of their political
preferences, but, rather, by playing on their sentiments to provoke feelings of enthusiasm for
certain candidates, or of fear and resentment towards others.10 As one account succinctly puts it,
campaigns serve as vehicles by which to disseminate “propaganda that are successful in causing
citizens to shift their expressed preferences toward the sponsoring candidate,” and not by causing
them to bring their enlightened interests in line with their voting decisions.11 There is thus also
little empirical evidence to support the contention that campaign spending is intended as, or has
the effect of, prompting reasoned evaluation on the part of those targeted by the messages that it
funds.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any set of conditions under which campaigns could
perform the function of occasioning reasoning about political preferences of the sort Kennedy
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envisages in his opinion for the majority in Citizens United. The purpose of campaigns, after all,
is to secure electoral victory for certain key political entities – parties, candidates, or electoral
platforms – and to do little else. The obsessive focus on electoral success turns campaigning into
what Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have termed a “competitive, zero-sum activity” in
which “[d]efeating your adversary is the dominant and legitimate motive.”12 Under these sorts of
constraints and incentive structures, it is difficult to imagine campaign finance ever supporting
the forms of expression which provoke citizens to carefully reconsider and reevaluate the beliefs
and preferences that they subscribe to in the light of alternate, reasoned viewpoints. Rather, the
imperatives of ensuring electoral victory are almost always likely to compel the organizers of
campaigns to fund messaging and activities which provoke emotional responses in citizens, since
emotional appeals have a greater likelihood of occasioning a change in voting behavior than the
reasoned and rational interchange of ideas in the electoral arena would.
Campaign Finance as Political Influence
The most prominent competitor to the informational conception of the normative salience
of campaign finance treats it as a form of political influence. On influence-based accounts,
campaign spending is an important means by which citizens can gain the attention of their
elected officials and political leaders, thereby enabling them to secure political outcomes which
they favor. The logic of this argument is not difficult to understand. Money may, without much
exaggeration, be regarded as the life-blood of competitive electoral campaigns, especially in in
countries as large and as heavily populated as the United States where voter outreach and
mobilization can only be effectively undertaken at considerable expense. When citizens donate
to competitive campaigns, therefore, they satisfy a voracious need that candidates and parties
have. Spending which helps to meet this insatiable demand for money can thus inspire feelings
of gratitude on the part of those who benefit from it, and one may reasonably expect such
gratitude, in turn, to be repaid through the enactment or promulgation of favorable policy
outcomes when their beneficiaries win their electoral contests and assume office.13 On the
influence-based conception, campaign spending, in this sense, thus serves as an important – if
not the most important – input into what the campaign finance scholar Larry Lessig has called
“the economy of influence” which determines the direction of government and shapes its policy
outcomes.14
Proponents of the influence-based conception, however, also encounter serious obstacles
to their arguments. The first of these emerges from the lack of any compelling empirical
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evidence that demonstrates that campaign spending has an impact on political outcomes. Thus, in
a seminal article titled “Why is There So Little Money in Politics?”, the political economists
Stephen Ansolabehere, James de Figueiredo and James Snyder offer a bevy of reasons to doubt
that campaign giving is motivated by the desire to exercise influence, and to believe that any
giving which is so motivated would in fact be a wasted investment. The authors of this article
begin their account by noting a peculiar feature of campaign spending in the United States: while
the sums that are spent on funding candidates and parties during federal elections are large in
absolute dollar terms, they form an infinitesimally small fraction of the total amount that is spent
by the federal government. Additionally, they observe that a large number of wealthy
organizations which have an interest in securing favorable political outcomes – corporations and
labor unions, for instance – do not spent on campaigns at all, or spend very little, nowhere near
the limits which electoral law imposes on campaign contributions and expenditures.15 The
relative indifference that these organized political actors display towards campaign spending thus
provides us with one preliminary reason to doubt whether spending of this nature does, in fact,
have an impact on political outcomes. Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder also sought to
provide an explanation for why this unwillingness on the part of well-funded interests was not
merely a form of over-cautious or otherwise irrational behavior. They did this by undertaking a
meta-analysis of over 40 studies which were aimed at determining whether campaign
contributions could effectively predict roll-call votes cast by members of Congress, as a means
of further determining if contributions had an influence on legislative outcomes. Based on this
meta-analysis, these scholars concluded that there was almost no evidence to suggest that
campaign contributions had any independent impact upon legislative outcomes. “Legislators’
votes,” they noted, “depend almost entirely upon their beliefs and the preferences of their voters
and their party.”16 The relative lack of interest that the wealthy and the well-mobilized displayed
in campaign spending is thus, in light of its minimal effects, entirely rational on their account.
In the years since its publication, several doubts have been raised about the accuracy of
the conclusions in “Why is There So Little Money in Politics?” None of these doubts, however,
have tested the fundamental assertion at the core of the article – that campaign finance is a poor
means of exerting influence over political outcomes. Thus, while some scholars have questioned
the accuracy of the meta-analysis undertaken by the authors of the article in the years following
its publication,17 most political economists tend to agree with its finding that legislative
outcomes are not directly dictated by campaign spending.18 Most recent influence-based
accounts, however, have moved away from arguing that campaign contributions make an impact
upon the votes of legislators to arguing, instead, that they play a crucial role in determining who
gains access to legislators, policy-makers, and other actors in positions of political authority.
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Campaign contributions, it is commonly asserted on this access-oriented version of the
influence-based conception, serve as important vehicles by means of which lobbyists are able to
win political concessions for the interests that back them, most prominently by enabling them to
engage in a strategy of “buying time” of legislators.19 When lobbyists marshal campaign
contributions towards legislators, in other words, they provide incentives to these officials to
grant them an audience where they can present the concerns and views of those whom they
represent. Since the time and attention of legislators is finite, it is feared that campaign
contributions purchase access for the wealthy at the expense of those who lack the resources to
engage in campaign spending and to hire lobbyists. In this way, the argument goes, unrestricted
campaign spending greatly restricts the range of views and voices that legislators are exposed to
in the course of discharging their functions of legislative agenda-setting and policy-making,
thereby conferring the wealthy and the well-connected a disproportionate amount of influence
over political outcomes.20 Campaign spending, in other words, enables lobbyists to undertake
what is termed an “exchange” strategy, where contributions are granted (or channeled) either as a
bid for the granting of legislative time and attention, or as a reward for the same.21
The trouble with these access-based arguments for treating campaign finance as a form of
political influence, however, is that they are contradicted by the funding practices of
contemporary lobbyists. To put this point somewhat differently, if the exchange strategy for
purchasing access – and hence, exercising influence – were prevalent, one would expect
lobbyists to direct most of their resources towards legislators who either took positions that were
opposed to their interests, or at least towards those who were ambivalent “fence-sitters” on issues
of significance to the interests that they represented. Surprisingly, however, the facts that we
have at our disposal about the habits of lobbyists indicate exactly the opposite: lobbyists tend to
concentrate the majority of their spending upon officials who are already ideologically allied
with them, and with whom they enjoy pre-existing relationships.22 The problem that this feature
of the practice of lobbying poses for the exchange strategy is obvious: it seems to indicate that
lobbyists expend huge sums of money – in the billions of dollars annually – to gain access to,
and hence to attempt to influence, those legislators whose interests and commitments are similar
to theirs, and who have a considerable degree of sympathy for the positions that they espouse. It
is difficult to regard such a strategy as being rational in any sense, and to understand why
lobbyists would be supported in such an endeavor by those who hire them.
These facts about the funding practices of lobbyists have prompted contemporary
political scientists to, for the most part, abandon access-based analyses of lobbying. Instead of
treating lobbyists as putative purchasers of access, scholars of politics now prefer to regard
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lobbyists as “information service bureaus,”23 or as providing a “legislative subsidy.”24 On this
view, the primary role that lobbyists perform is of providing legislators with information that is
relevant to the performance of their jobs. There are three kinds of information, in particular,
which legislators look to lobbyists to obtain. The first is information of a technical or complex
nature which legislators do not have the skills or resources to obtain and understand on their
own.25 Secondly, lobbyists can also make information about legislative strategy accessible to
legislators, leveraging their political connections to provide elected officials with details about
the policy preferences of other legislators, as well as of the procedural obstacles that lie in the
way of achieving political outcomes that they favor. Lobbyists, in the words of the political
economists Richard Hall and Alan Deardorff, thus provide crucial “political intelligence” to
those whom they support and engage with.26 Finally, lobbyists can also provide legislators with
information about the views and preferences of their constituents. The importance of lobbyists,
in this regard, emerges from the manner in which they can assist legislators to align their policy
interests with their electoral interests.27 It is pertinent to point out, in this regard, that legislators
are more likely to trust, and hence to rely upon, information provided to them by lobbyists with
whom they are closely affiliated and share common political ground.
It is important to note that while political scientists focus on the informational role that
lobbyists play in contemporary politics, they also take great care to emphasize that the
information that is provided to legislators is far from innocuous, and often – if not always –
filtered through the strategic preferences and biases that these lobbyists hold. By controlling
what information is made available to legislators, and how it is conveyed, therefore, lobbyists are
able to determine legislative outcomes in a manner that benefits the interests of those whom they
represent – usually the wealthy or the well-connected – at the expense of the less well-off and the
poorly mobilized.28 For the purpose of the present account, however, it is important to note that
campaign finance only plays a limited role in determining political outcomes through the
provision of political information in this form. Thus, engaging in campaign spending can allow
new entrants into the lobbying field to establish their credentials and signal their political
affiliations by establishing patterns of political giving along ideological and partisan lines.
Additionally, where lobbyists continue to raise and spend large sums of money for those with
whom they are already aligned, they also continue to signal their commitment and interest to
those politicians who benefit from such giving. Campaign contributions, it thus follows, may
smooth the way for lobbyists to access legislators, but they are not, in and of themselves, the
chief source through which lobbyists impact political outcomes. Such impact emerges from the
informational services that lobbyists provide to these legislators – services in which, it bears
reiterating, campaign spending plays no role. To the extent that campaign spending does provide
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access to legislators, therefore, it does so in a manner that does not necessarily confer influence
in way that proponents of the exchange model allege it does.
It is relevant to note, furthermore, that contributions form only one way – and a marginal
one, at that – in which relationships can be established and maintained between lobbyists and
elected officials. Indeed, political observers often argue that employing individuals who are close
to legislators, or those with considerable policy expertise, is a more effective way of building
political ties with legislators than engaging in campaign spending. 29 From an informational
standpoint, this makes a good deal of sense: lobbyists who hire their former staffers are more
successfully able to establish their reliability, ideological affinity and trustworthiness by
leveraging the sort of personal connections that the mere making of campaign contributions is
unable to nurture. Contributions thus appear to matter only at the periphery even in providing
access, casting further doubt on the belief that the exchange strategy is widely resorted to by
lobbyists as means of securing political outcomes that favor those whom they represent. It
follows, from the foregoing discussion, that the imposition of strict limits on campaign spending
is unlikely to bring about a reduction in the asymmetric nature in which political influence is
currently distributed in the United States. Those concerned with mitigating the stranglehold that
the wealthy and the well-connected exercise over the political process – a grip that is all too real
and well-documented – would thus do better if they turned their attention to reforming means of
political participation other than campaign finance. For those seeking to understand how
campaign finance works, and what the source of its political importance is, however, the search
for a conceptually sound and empirically plausible theory of campaign spending still continues.
It is time, therefore, to turn to providing the outlines of exactly one such account of campaign
finance, which treats it as an important means by which citizens may obtain affirmation for their
political preferences.
Campaign Finance and the Affirmation of Political Preferences
Before proceeding with discussing how campaign finance enables those who engage in it
to obtain the affirmation of their political preferences, it is necessary, as a preliminary matter, to
spend a little time on understanding the role that elections play in conferring legitimacy upon the
political positions taken by those who win them, as well as of their supporters, endorsers, and
funders. Electoral outcomes hold a particularly exalted status in the democratic imagination.
Where an electoral platform gains victory, the candidates and parties running on it, as well as
their supporters, are able to plausibly assert a mandate for the issues and policy positions which
comprise that platform, even though the supposed public consent for such a mandate is usually
hypothetical and constructed, rather than being an actual sociological fact.30 The claiming of
such a mandate serves two purposes: one which is primarily administrative in nature, and the
other being chiefly moral in its emphasis. In the first instance, electoral victory creates a
presumption – albeit a rebuttable one – in favor of the validity and desirability of political
decision-making which furthers the campaign promises that were made by those parties,
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candidates, and coalitions who form the government upon the completion of elections. We see
this, for instance, in some the arguments that Barack Obama and Congressional Democrats
offered for prioritizing the comprehensive reform of the American healthcare system in the face
of concerted opposition from Republicans, and the demands that the prolonged economic
recession was making on legislative time and attention. Since healthcare reform, the argument
went, was a core component of the Democratic Party’s platform, as well as a major issue on the
campaign agenda in the Presidential election of 2008, efforts to overhaul the American health
care system were to be regarded as presumptively valid, as electoral victories for the President,
and for the Democrats who formed a majority in Congress, could reasonably be interpreted as
conferring a popular mandate for such an outcome.
The second, and for our purposes, more important, role that electoral victory serves is to
allow the supporters of winning platforms to claim legitimacy for those political positions and
beliefs to which they attach salience. The chief impact of electoral success, in this context, is not
the momentum that it generates for particular legislative outcomes, but rather, the enhancement
in moral valence that accrues to issues that form part of the agenda on the basis of which
campaigns are fought. The legitimating effect of electoral victory was captured most evocatively
by Tocqueville, when he discussed the reactions that impending Presidential elections had upon
political parties in Jacksonian America. Ordinarily content to remain aloof from the public,
Tocqueville observed, parties felt a great need, during the run-up to elections,
“to rally around an individual in order to communicate more effectively with the masses. Thus
they generally use the name of the Presidential candidate as a symbol: they make him the
personification of their theories. Hence the parties have a great interest in winning Presidential
elections, not so much in order to aid in achieving the triumph of their doctrines as to
demonstrate by electing him that those doctrines enjoy the support of the majority.”31
While Tocqueville does not explicitly articulate what it is about majority support for a party’s
“doctrines” which make electoral victory so vital, the reasons are fairly obvious. Electoral
victory allows winning parties to claim that their views and positions are more democratically
legitimate than – and hence, normatively superior to – parties on the losing side. This claim is, of
course, a rebuttable one, since electoral victory is not the only factor determinative of democratic
legitimacy. As the political theorist Russell Muirhead validly notes, the fact “that the numerous
have some claim is not to say that its claim is absolute, or trumps every other claim. It is rather
one ingredient in the mix of democratic legitimacy.”32 Nevertheless, in the absence of
compelling moral flaws pervading the positions which parties in government take on the
campaign trail, or of reasons which call the fairness of the electoral process into question,
electoral victory adds significant rhetorical force to claims of greater moral worth when they are
made by winning parties. While the fundamental issues at stake in contemporary elections rarely
pack the same sort of moral punch that those in antebellum America did, the legitimacyconferring role that elections play upon the political preferences of those who ally themselves
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with particular candidates nevertheless continues to serve as an important motor of electoral
mobilization and participation in our time as well.
While Tocqueville’s discussion is limited to parties, it does not take much imagination to
see how electoral success can also have a similarly legitimating effect upon the preferences to
which individuals attach salience. Where citizens ally themselves closely with a particular party
or candidate – in other words, act in a partisan manner – and where that party or candidate
secures electoral victory, these citizens too may rely on this outcome to claim greater democratic
legitimacy for the preferences which they share with it. Campaign contributions, in particular,
can play an extremely prominent role in conferring legitimacy upon the political views that
partisans adhere to. They can serve the instrumental purpose of enabling their beneficiaries to
secure electoral victory, by underwriting the expenses necessary to motivate the public to take a
sympathetic view of their proposals, and to mobilize them to turn out in their support during the
elections. Contributions, in this way, allow those making them to take ownership of the electoral
victories of the candidates and parties whom they support. Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly, where citizens donate funds to candidates or parties, they make it possible for these
entities to disseminate their ideas – and, by extension, the ideas of their partisan supporters – to
the public at large. Where the beneficiaries of such partisan spending gain electoral victory, they
allow their donors to claim that their views, and not those of partisans on the losing side, have
been heard by their fellow citizens, and found to be convincing by them. These claims may, as I
have noted above, be adduced in support of arguments which seek to establish the pro tanto
validity of legislation favored exclusively by partisans of those in the winning coalition, but they
may also be presented to underpin the normative desirability of the positions that these partisans
take. In so doing, one may argue, campaign contributions can have the effect of affirming the
political preferences that partisans hold, where the beneficiaries of such contributions are able to
secure electoral victory.
It is important to note, at this point, that while the obtaining of electoral success is
perhaps the most effective way by means of which campaign spenders are able to gain
legitimacy (and hence, affirmation) for their political preferences, the pursuit of electoral victory
through such spending can also have similar effects. Thus, where citizens engage in campaign
spending, they may be able to obtain the same sort of affirmation of their political preferences as
arises when individuals are able to secure a public hearing for their views. Where citizens are
allowed and encouraged to support political causes and entities in furtherance of their beliefs
without fearing reprisal or coercion, they may come to internalize the belief that these viewpoints
are important. The display of toleration and restraint on the part of the legal system, and of those
exposed to the views that campaign spending funds, in other words, can engender respect and
regard for these views among those who hold them.33 Secondly, campaign spending may also
result in the affirmation of political preferences by generating relationships of solidarity among
funders. Here campaign spending is conducted in a transparent and open manner, citizens who
contribute to a favored party, candidate, or cause are able to see that their views are not held in
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isolation, and that a portion of their fellow-citizens are also committed to the same views and
preferences that animate them. The recognition that political beliefs are shared by others can also
serve as a powerful source of affirmation of those beliefs. It demonstrates to those individuals
holding these views that they are not mistaken or misled in the degree of significance which they
attach to their political preferences, since many of their peers feel as strongly about the relevant
political issues as they do.34 Finally, campaign spending can also lead to the affirmation of
political preferences by occasioning contestation among citizens who are exposed to campaign
messaging which they disagree with, or otherwise find objectionable. Where citizens are able to
respond to these messages by engaging in messaging of their own, thereby engaging in a robust
defense of their own preferences and beliefs, they may find themselves taking their own political
views more seriously, and according a higher level of regard to them as a result.35
The argument that campaign spending secures the affirmation of political preferences
avoids many of the pitfalls identified with the influence-based conception of campaign finance.
For starters, attributing an affirmational role to such spending offers us a convincing explanation
for why donors continue to spend large sums of money to support candidates and make
independent expenditures despite the limited influence that such expenditures exercise upon
political outcomes which they favor. Campaign spending, for these individuals, can be regarded
as a means of standing with parties and candidates whom they identify with, or of ensuring the
dissemination of the political views that they favor, in an attempt to gain affirmation for one’s
beliefs. The large sums that they spend on candidates and outcomes which they favor, therefore,
ought not to be regarded as an irrational pursuit of influence, but, rather, as a means of engaging
in self-expression. It is important to note, however, that there is little in the way of
incontrovertible evidence available to us (yet) to demonstrate that most campaign spending is, in
fact, driven by the desire to obtain the affirmation of political preferences in the manner
highlighted above. Unfortunately, scholars who study campaign participation have only paid
limited attention to understanding the motivations that underpin spending on the part of
campaign donors. It is possible, however, to produce some indirect support for the foregoing
argument by noting the manner in which it can satisfactorily explain a peculiar feature of the
American campaign finance system: the widespread and increasing levels of engagement in
campaign spending on the part of ordinary donors; that is, of individuals who give less than
$1,000 to candidates and as independent expenditures in any election cycle.36 As recent surveys
show, cumulative donations in the amount of $1,000 or less have been increasing at an extremely
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fast pace in recent federal elections.37 The informational model, focused as it is on the effects of
spending rather than upon its causes, is unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for why such
spending occurs. Indeed, given the extremely high costs associated with purchasing airtime and
engaging in other forms of campaign mobilization, it is unlikely that donors who give in small
amounts believe that their contributions will have an impact on the nature and amount of
information available to the public on the eve of the elections. This is especially unlikely to be
the case in light of the (well-known) fact that parties, candidates, and independent expenditure
committees raise most of their funds from large donors and entrenched interest groups, rather
than from ordinary donors. Nor can the influence-based conception offer a full explanation for
the increasing presence of ordinary donors in American campaigns. Given the huge sums that
large donors and special interests make available to parties and candidates during elections, it
would be entirely unreasonable for an individual who spends $1,000 or thereabouts, and who has
no other means of obtaining access to elected officials, to expect to influence political decisionmaking by means of her contribution.
The affirming effects argument put forth in this account offers us a better explanation for
why small donors – despite the widespread cynicism that Americans display towards electoral
politics in general, and campaign finance in particular – are resorting to campaign spending in
ever-increasing numbers. Campaign donations allow these individuals to purse legitimacy for
their political preferences by contributing, however modestly, to the electoral success of the
parties and candidates whom they identify with politically, or who take congruent positions on
political issues to which they attach salience; campaign spending, for them, is thus akin to
volunteering time for political canvassing and other forms of mobilization efforts. Such
spending, in other words, serves as a means by which partisans and issue advocates can dedicate
the resources at their disposal to ensuring that their “side,” or the political positions which they
support, obtains popular approval at the hustings. It is this desire to obtain electoral legitimacy
for their preferences which explains why ordinary donors respond with alacrity to fundraising
messages that specifically target them. As scholars of political spending have noted, ordinary
donor involvement in campaign funding is strongly correlated with efforts on the part of
candidates and parties, and to a lesser extent, of issue and advocacy groups, to solicit funds from
such individuals.38 These fundraising messages signal financial need on the part of those who
issue them, and are often couched in terms which predict detrimental political consequences
which are likely to arise if they are not heeded. In this way, fundraising solicitation motivates
partisan supporters and issue advocates to step up their spending efforts, in a bid secure electoral
legitimacy for the political positions that they share with those sending them these messages, or,
as is often the case, to prevent those politically opposed to them from obtaining electoral
approval for their views and preferences.
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The ancillary affirming effects of campaign spending – its impact on developing greater
regard for the preferences that campaign donors hold by conferring recognition, engendering
solidarity, or occasioning contestation – helps us understand another peculiar feature of
campaign spending in the American context: the disproportionate role that donors who hold
strong and politically intense views which are located outside the political mainstream play in the
making of small contributions.39 The importance of campaign spending for these ideological
“extremists” cannot be attributed to the role that electoral success plays in affirming their
political preferences. Those ordinary donors who give their hard-earned money to the Libertarian
Party, or in support of Dennis Kucinich’s efforts to win the Democratic Presidential primary,
after all, are fully aware of the futility of such spending as a means of helping their beneficiaries
secure office. For these individuals, then, campaign spending is best understood as a means by
which to obtain affirmation for their political preferences in the three distinct ways that I have
identified above. In the first instance, by enabling the dissemination of views that they regard as
important to the public at large, those citizens who adhere to preferences that lie outside the
political mainstream are able to gain a greater regard for their beliefs. Additionally, by allowing
these individuals to join in common cause with other citizens who share their preferences, and
who are committed enough to them to spend their precious money on candidates and platforms
furthering them, campaign spending may heighten the respect that they accord to their political
positions by engendering solidarity. Finally, spending which supports “extremist” candidates and
platforms can also help those who incur it to stand in opposition to the positions taken by more
mainstream political actors. In so doing, it may serve to enhance the attachment and regard
which they have towards their own political preferences, by allowing them to contest and
challenge those views which they regard as problematic.
It is not too difficult to appreciate the appeal of campaign spending, when understood as
furthering the affirmation of political preferences, in light of the foregoing examples. While
campaign finance may not contribute to the creation of a more enlightened citizenry, and may
not occasion greater responsiveness on the part of political leaders towards the concerns of those
who spend to get them elected, it nevertheless continues to have considerable democratic
importance and valence. Thus, in the first instance, by enabling individuals to obtain democratic
legitimacy for their political preferences along the lines described above, campaign spending can
create a deeper appreciation and regard for democratic politics among those who resort to it.
Increasing participation in campaign spending may thus serve as one important means – though
by no means the exclusive one – by which to counteract the widespread prevalence of apathy and
disenchantment which political scientists identify as the defining features of the attitudes that
citizens of contemporary advanced industrial democracies manifest towards their elected
officials.40 Secondly, and no less crucially, campaign spending may also appeal to those citizens
who hold unpopular or under-represented political views, by enabling them to obtain a fair and
respectful hearing for their beliefs and positions in public. In so doing, the sort of affirmation for
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political preferences that recourse to campaign spending facilitates can serve to enhance the
political standing of citizens with preferences that are in the minority of mainstream opinion,
thereby contributing considerably to the enhancement of the legitimacy of democratic
government – understood both in normative and sociological senses of the term.41
The appeal of the informational and influence-based conceptions is not limited
exclusively to the manner in which they help to organize views on the importance of campaign
spending. Rather, the dominance that these conceptions have exerted over scholarly as well as
public debates concerning campaign spending can be attributed, in large part, to the easily
comprehensible policy proposals that they support. Thus, those who subscribe to the
informational account of campaign finance often (though not always) tend to be leery of
regulations which impose restrictions upon the amounts that citizens – acting independently or in
concert – can spend on campaigns.42 Restrictions of this sort, proponents of the informational
conception fear, may undermine the educative and empowering potential inherent in electoral
campaigns by reducing the quantum of information that voters are exposed to. For their part,
adherents of the influence-based conception are far more accepting of spending limits upon
campaign expenditures. For these adherents, spending restrictions are critical means by which
the ability of the wealthy and the politically well-connected to monopolize the attention of
elected representatives may be curtailed. Restrictions of this sort can achieve this end either by
undermining the capacity of spenders for engendering gratitude on the part of their beneficiaries,
or by limiting the extent to which they can “dominate” campaign discourse and hence “drown
out” the voices of citizens of more ordinary means.43 Restrictions upon the amounts that may be
spent on campaigns are thus, for proponents of the influence-based view, essential to
safeguarding the ability of ordinary citizens to ensure that governmental decision-making
remains responsive to their interests and concerns.
The foregoing account, by providing grounds for treating the informational and
influence-based conceptions of the importance of campaign spending with skepticism,
undermines the respective regulatory approaches that their adherents endorse as well. Happily,
for our present purposes, the affirmational account of campaign finance is entirely consistent
with a third form of regulatory approach – one which privileges the building of floors which
enhance the ability of citizens of ordinary means to engage in campaign spending instead of
emphasizing the importance of placing ceilings on the amounts that the wealthy and the wellconnected may spend on elections.44 There are two inter-connected reasons for why this strategy
41
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of building floors is congenial to the affirmational argument for the importance of campaign
finance. In the first instance, the affirmational value identified above can be realized only
partially by an unregulated market in campaign spending of the sort that proponents of the
informational conception support. The huge disparities in income which characterize the
American polity, combined with the high costs associated with purchasing airtime and engaging
in mass mobilization, ensure that only a tiny proportion of Americans can obtain the
affirmational benefits of campaign spending in the absence of any regulation of the campaign
finance regime. Imposing strict restrictions upon the amounts that citizens may spend in support
of electoral activity along the lines proposed by those who rely on the influence-based
conception, however, does not help overcome this problem. Rather, the adoption of low
campaign contribution and independent expenditure limits may in fact diminish the affirmational
potential inherent in such spending by reducing the ability of all Americans – regardless of
income, political interest, and partisan commitment – to strive to attain democratic legitimacy for
the candidates, causes, or parties which they favor. It follows, therefore, that a regulatory regime
which focuses its attention on enhancing the ability of ordinary citizens to participate in
campaign spending alone can enable these citizens to obtain affirmation for their political
preferences in a meaningful manner. Regrettably, the question of how a regime of this sort may
be designed is one which must, in the interests of time and space, be left to be answered at a later
moment.
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